USING THE BEHAVIOR ANTAGONISM AND THE BIMATRIX GAME THEORY IN THE IT PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Abstract

Context. The article proposes a method of analyzing the proposals of team members in order to avoid conflict situations at the stage of team formation.

Objective. The object of the study is the method of analyzing the proposals of team members while solving project tasks.

The purpose of the work is to analyze the developed method of analysis of proposals of team members to avoid or resolve conflict situations at the stage of team activation

Method. The developed method is based on the theory of matrix games. Conflicts between individual team members mainly arise at the stage of team formation. For the project manager, it is important to identify the conflict situation in time and find a way out of it to satisfy both team members and without harming the teamwork as a whole. A team created to implement an IT project is often faced with a situation where two of its members have different visions of approaches to creating the final product. At the same time, each of them has experience in the development of similar software products or services by different teams. To effectively solve this situation, we suggest using approaches typical of bimatrix games, when each of these team members is considered as a player. This takes into account the fact that the bimatrix theory of games is based on a conflict between two players whose interests are opposite – an antagonistic zero-sum game is precisely the basis of the developed approach.

Results. The proposed method of analysis of proposals of team members contributes to the avoidance or resolution of conflict situations at the stage of their closer interaction. For efficient solution of the said situation, we propose to use approaches being typical for bimatrix games when each of these team members is treated as a player. At the same time, account is taken of the fact that the bimatrix game theory is based on a conflict of two players whose interests are opposite – an antagonistic game with a zero sum being that very element to constitute the basis of the approach developed.

Conclusions. The given calculation of the model example shows that the use of the proposed method allows the project manager to give a reasonable preference to another team member, since the expected average profit of this player is greater than that of the first player. In this case, the manager has an opportunity to simulate situations for the players (for the team) and promptly respond to probable deviations of their behavioral strategies from the optimal ones, establish healthy relationships between team members and choose the best proposals for solving project tasks.